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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The following statements are to clarify or modify the Statement of the Case as stated by 
Appellant Jerry Christian and Joy Christian (Christians): 
1. Between Februaiy 2001 and December 2001, Mason invested various sums of money 
with Robert McClung (McClung). Over this time period, Mason withdrew his entire 
investment at various times .. At other times he withdrew only the stated earnings. 
(R. p. 68.) 
2. In July 2001, Mason's father, Monte Mason, sold his house and invested $79,042.06 
of the proceeds from the sale with McClung, using Mason's account. Some various 
statements (RRLM) from McClung were sent in Monte Mason's name. (R. pp. 69-
71.) 
3. In December 2001, Mason withdrew all of the funds he had personally invested with 
McClung, together with all reported earnings related to his investment. 
4, In 2002 and thereafter, all of the funds in Mason's account with McClung belonged to 
Mason's father and no additional funds were invested. Reported earnings for 
Mason's account were paid out each and every month. In some months, some of the 
principal was also withdrawn. A comparison between McC!ung's statements and 
checks written, distinctly traces and shows to what each withdrawal was related (i.e. e 
reported earnings or principal). (R. pp. 68, 80-87 and l 06-111 ). 
5. On September 2, 2002, the remaining balance of $30,905.06 was withdrawn. 
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6. Mason disagrees with Christians' assertion that Mason failed to substantiate any 
excess in his account belonged to his father. (Br. Appellant 5.) Mason laid a 
sufficient foundation. Mason had the ability to know from whom he received funds 
from and to where he disbursed such funds. 
7. Mason also disagrees with Christians' assertion that "Mason also asserted without 
substantiation that the last payments McClung made to him were "returns of 
principal," and that earlier payments to him were "earnings" on his "investment."" 
(Br. Appellant 6.) The documents in this case show that the exact amount of 
withdrawals coincide with the reported earnings, such as in the summary found on 
page 68 of the Clerk's Record on Appeal. 
8. Mason had no knowledge of McClung's illegal activity prior to the withdrawal of all 
investments and reported earnings from his account with McClung. 
9. After McClung filed for bankruptcy protection in 2004, an unsecured creditor's 
committee was formed and Plaintiff Jerry Christian (Christian) was appointed 
chairman of the committee. 
l 0. The bankruptcy trustee took no steps to recover any of the money Mason received 
from McClung. Christian, acting in his individual capacity or on behalf of the 
unsecured creditor's committee, did not seek any action through the bankruptcy court 
to obtafo funds from Mason. 
11. Neither party requested a jury trial. 
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ATTORNEY FEES OF APPEAL 
Mason requests the Court award him attorney fees and costs on appeal. The basis for 
requesting attorney fees on appeal is found in Idaho Code§§ 12-121 and 12-123. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Because neither party requested a jury trial, the District Court could have drawn reasonable 
inferences from the uncontroverted facts, despite the possibility of conflicting inferences. Chapin 
v. Linden, 144 Idaho 393, 397, 162 P.3d 772, 775 (2007). See also Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 
Idaho 434, 437, 807 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991). The Appellate Court has free review over the 
findings of the District Court. Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat'[ Ass'n, 141 Idaho 362, 366, 109 P.3d 
1104, 1108 (2005). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the District Court err in granting summary judgment to Mason? 
2. Did the District Court err in denying Christians' Motion for Summary Judgment? 
3. Is Mason entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs of appeal? 
ARGUMENT 
1. The Court Did Not Err in Granting Summary Judgment to Mason. 
a. Christians lacked standing to pursue the claims. 
Christians assert that the standing issue was raised sua sponte by the Court. This is 
not true. The Answer filed by Mason affirmatively states (Sixth Affirmative Defense) that 
Christians were not the real party in interest. (R. p. 23.) Further, Christians did not have any 
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portion of the oral arguments transcribed. (R. p.153.) In its decision, the District Court, 
obviously referenced the arguments made. (R. p. 149.) Even if the issue was raised solely by the 
District Court, Christians cite no authority supporting the proposition that to do so was error. 
The decision by the District Court was based upon a relatively simple basis - Federal 
bankruptcy law preempts State law. Because Christians did not sue in any capacity related to the 
bankruptcy, they are barred from asserting this independent action. 
Section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes the trustee to pursue any fraudulent 
conveyance claim that might have been pursued by a creditor or debtor and, in doing so, may use 
either federal or state law. Section 544(b) provides that "[t}he trustee may avoid any transfer of 
an interest of the debtor in property or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable 
under applicable law by a creditor holding an unsecured claim .... " 11 U.S.C.A. §544(b)(l). 
This includes the authority to proceed under Idaho's Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA). 
Cases in the Ninth Circuit (and around the country) have consistently held that a trustee can 
pursue fraudulent conveyances under state law. See Danell v. Kawell, No. 06-55544, 2008 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 13843 (9th Cir. July 1, 2008); In re United Energy, 944 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1991); 
Von Gunten v. Neilson (In re Slatkin), 243 F. App'x 255 (2007). 
Christians cited case law, such as Klingman v. Levinson, 158 BR 109 (N.D. Ill. 1993), 
which holds that the bankruptcy trustee's exclusive right to maintain a fraudulent conveyance 
action expires, and creditors may step in, when the bankruptcy trustee no longer has a viable 
cause of action, such as when an estate closing. (Br. Appellant l 0.) Christians advocate that 
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this Court take judicial notice ofMcClung's bankruptcy case in the United States Bankruptcy 
Court for the District ofidaho, Case Number 03-40682. Mason has no objection to this Court 
taking judicial notice. McClung's bankruptcy estate was not closed and the trustee was not 
discharged until May l 0, 2007, eight months after both the federal and state statute of limitations 
had expired for fraudulent conveyances. Because, under §544(b ), the bankruptcy trustee had the 
authority to proceed under Idaho's UFTA, the bankmptcy trustee possessed the exclusive 
authority to recover fraudulently conveyed funds for the four years after the conveyance. 
During the years the bankruptcy case was proceeding, Christians were very active in the 
bankruptcy case. While the bankruptcy case was proceeding, Christians: (a) filed a Motion to 
Lift Stay, (b) filed an Amended Motion to Lift Stay, (c) obtained a judgment, and (d) filed a 50 
page affidavit (Document 4 7) advocating, because of their belief that the bankruptcy trustee was 
failing to do so, that McClung be denied any relief under the bankruptcy laws because of his 
wrongdoing. The Christian affidavit, prepared in October 2003, shows that Christian had a very 
substantial knowledge ofMcClung's receipt and distribution of funds (see Bankr. D. Idaho Case 
No. 03-40682, Doc. 47 ~ 18), which Christian obviously reviewed as chairman of the unsecured 
creditor's committee. Under 11 U.S.C.A. § 1102(a), the powers and duties of an unsecured 
creditor's committee is to investigate the financial condition of the debtor and the committee may 
ask the court to appoint an examiner to further investigate the matter, including fraud. The 
bankruptcy record is void of Christian informing the trustee or the Bankruptcy Court of the 
possibility of bringing a fraudulent conveyance action against Mason. Christians filed this 
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lawsuit in July 2006, while the bankruptcy case was still open, but did not effect service until six 
months later, apparently waiting until the time for service was about to expire. (IRCP 4(a)(2)) 
(R. p. 1.) There is no evidence to support either the proposition that the bankruptcy trustee had 
abandoned its rights to the cause of action, or that the case was not viable. Christians' claims 
under Idaho's UFTA expired at the same time as did the trustee's claim to the same. Under 
Idaho's UFTA laws, Idaho Code§ 55-918, a creditor has four years to pursue a claim. Because 
the bankruptcy trustee has the authority to pursue recovery of assets as a cause of action under 
Idaho's UFT A, it also has the ability to use Idaho's longer statute of limitation. The bankruptcy 
trustee has the ability to use different causes of action which in tum allows for different statutes 
of limitation, which are considered substantive in nature. In re Avi, Inc., 389 B.R. 721 (9'h Cir. 
June 13, 2008); Heaper v. Brown, 214 B.R. 576 (8th Cir. B.A.P. 2007). 
Christians argue that the bankruptcy trustee abandoned his claim. (Br. Appellant 14.) 
No supporting document was cited showing that the bankruptcy trustee had abandoned any 
claim within the statute oflimitation time period. Christians' arguments are against prudent 
policy. The purpose of the bankruptcy trustee, as correctly indicated by the District Court, is to 
represent all creditors and for the "orderly administration of the bankruptcy estate by providing 
judicial supervision over the litigation to be undertaken." (R. p. 149.) If Christians feel the 
bankruptcy trustee failed in its duty to pursue this claim, they could have petitioned the 
Bankruptcy Court, as was their course of action in opposing McClung's discharge. Instead, 
Christians took intentional steps to appropriate the cause of action for themselves, instead of all 
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creditors. See In re Monsour Medical Center, 5 B.R. 715, 718 (Bkrtcy.Pa. 1980). The District 
Court was correct in ruling that allowing Christians to pursue this state action frustrated the 
Bankruptcy Court's function. (R. pp. 149-150.) 
2. The District Court did not err in denying Christians' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Christians assert that there is no genuine issue and material fact and that the District Court 
should have granted summary judgment to the Christians. Apparently, Christians are attempting 
to appeal a surumary judgment decision that has not been made .. Implicitly, dismissing 
Christians' lawsuit is a denial of their Motion for Summary Judgment. However, such decision 
is not reviewable. There is no provision for appeal of a summary judgment decision under IAR 
11. An order denying a motion for summary judgment is neither appealable, nor reviewable on 
appeal from a final judgment. Hunter v. Dep't of Corr., 138 Idaho 44, 46, 57 P.3d 755, 757 (2002). 
Therefore, the Court should not consider the Christians' arguments that it was error for the District 
Court to deny their motion for summary judgment. 
Going to the merits of Christians arguments, Mason recognizes that, under the Idaho UFTA, 
one can be totally innocent, like himself, and still be subject to return of net gains. An extensive 
discussion, as Christians has done, is not necessary. Mason has two defenses to the fraudulent 
transfer allegations. Both defenses respond to Christians' arguments on appeal, but also serve as an 
additional support for granting summary judgment to Mason, even though the District Court did not 
expressly rule on the same. The first defense is that Mason only received reasonably equivalent 
7 
value. The second defense is that the funds Mason received from McClung in 2002 belonged to his 
father, not himself. 
a. Reasonably equivalent value was given. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 55-918, Christians had four years to bring the fraudulent 
conveyance related to disputed distribution from McCiung. Christians were aware of this particular 
statute because, in paragraph 9 of their Complaint, they refer only to the three transfers to Mason, 
which took place less than four years earlier. 
Each transfer is considered independently to determine whether or not the transfer was 
fraudulent. The entire statutory scheme (Idaho Code, Chapter 9 of Title 55), regarding fraudulent 
conveyances, is in the singular. In addition, there is a clear limitation on what is recoverable in a case 
like the present case, wherein the action against the transferee is procrastinated. In Donel!, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated: 
Moreover, pursuant to UFT A, the Receiver is only entitled to 
recovery of the amounts above Kowell's initial investment 
transferred within the limitations period. Thus, the statute protects 
Kowell in two ways. It allows him to keep the full amount of his 
original investment, see Scholes, 56 F.3d at 757, and it shields 
those "profits" paid to Kowell for which the statute oflimitations 
has nm. 
Danell v. Kowell, No. 06-55544, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 13843, at *30 (9'h Cir. July I, 2008). 
The evidence shows that each and every month Mason received the exact amount of 
withdrawal as the reported earning, with the exception of a couple of months where principal was 
withdrawn. Even in such months, a clear break down between principal and reported earnings can be 
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made for each disbursement. Contrary to this distinct evidence, Christians make the argument, 
without supporting authority, that all of the last disbursements where reported earnings, not principal. 
As Donnell recently held, "gains" paid outside of the statute of limitation period are not subject to 
recovery. Because of Mason's investment practices, accounting can readily be done. Of the 
$45,615.19 received after July 20, 2002, $44,042.06 is the return of principal. The remaining 
$1,572.13 is reported earnings, which has been acknowledged from the beginning of this case. 
However, such amount would be de minimis to the present proceeding. 
The basis of a defense to a fraudulent conveyance allegation cited by Christians (Idaho 
Code§ 55-913(l)(a) and (b), and§ 55-914(1)) is if the transfer was in exchange for "reasonable 
equivalent value." Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 55-913(l)(a), the defense has the additional element of 
"good faith." "Reasonable equivalent value" is not defined in Idaho statute or law. Federal and state 
courts look at determining reasonable equivalent value on a case-by-case basis. Obviously, the main 
factors include the difference between the amount paid and amount received. In addition, other 
factors considered include good faith of the recipient and whether or not the transaction was made at 
arms length. Mellon Bank, NA. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of R.ML., Inc., 92 F .3d 
139, 151-54 (3d Cir. 1996). Mason's withdrawals or payments correspond to a complete and exact 
accounting of the distributions. There is no evidence fuat Mason was in collusion with McClung or 
that he was an insider. Mason and Christians were equal in their respective relationships and 
knowledge as to McClung. 
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For the reasons and facts stated above and with the exception of the de minimis amount, the 
disputed funds received by Mason were the return of principal. 
b. Mason is not liable for the funds he received which belonged to his father. 
Idaho law allows recovery against the "the first transferee of the asset or the person for 
whose benefit the transfer was made .... " Idaho Code §55-917(2)(a). Although Mason handled his 
father's money by allowing it to be invested in Mason's name and Mason was the payee on the 
checks, nevertheless, the funds belonged to his father and Mason received rio benefit from the funds. 
Christians attack Mason's affidavit (R. pp. 65-88), wherein Mason establishes that the 
funds remaining in the account in 2002 were solely his fathers' funds, by asserting that such 
statements are conclusory. Mason was the person with factual knowledge as to the funds he 
personally handled as well as being knowledgeable of his own financial affairs. A sufficient 
fow1dation exists. Noteworthy is the fact that some of the McClung (RRLM) statements indicate 
"Monte Mason" as the client (R. pp. 69-71) and that Christians provided no contradictory evidence. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated: 
Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue 
of material fact, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to show 
that a genuine issue of material fact does exist. (Citation omitted). 
A non-moving party must come forward with evidence by way of 
affidavit or otherwise which contradicts the evidence submitted by 
the moving party, and which establishes the existence of a material 
issue of disputed fact. (Citation omitted); Zehm v. Assoc. Logging 
Contractors, Inc., 116 Idaho 349,350, 775 P.2d 1191, 1192 
(1988). 
Kiebert v. Goss, 144 Idal10, 225,228, 159 P.3d 862, 865 (2007). 
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The evidence is undisputed that the 2002 funds were Mason's fathers, that Mason received no 
benefit from his father's funds, and that Mason is entitled to summary judgment in his favor. 
3. Mason Is Entitled to His Attorney Fees and Costs on Appeal. 
"Attorney fees are awardable if an appeal does no more than simply invite an appellate court to 
second-guess the trial court on conflicting evidence." Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 719, 170 P.3d 
375,383 (2007) (citing Anderson v. Larsen, 136 Idaho 402,408, 34 P.3d 1085, 1091(2001)). In the 
present case, Christians are simply requesting the appellate court to second-guess the District Court. 
It is appropriate to award attorney fees and costs to Mason. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the District Court granting Mason summary judgment should be affirmed and 
Mason should be awarded his attorney fees and costs. 
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